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Abstract
Inter-state wars are not one of the most salient features in the post-Cold War era. 
The literature on contemporary armed conlict, particularly those in the atermath of the 
Cold War, tends to overlook the centrality of territory in the causation of war. However, a 
border incident between Eritrea and Ethiopia in 1998 led to a crisis which escalated. The 
war lasted two and a half years, leading to an estimated .  casualties. The article’s 
central claim shows the centrality of territory in its multiple dimensions for the under-
standing of the war that opposed the two sovereign states.
Keywords: war, territory, borders, identities, nationalism 
Resumo 
As guerras inter-estatais não são uma das características mais salientes do pós-
Guerra Fria. A literatura que analisa os conlitos contemporâneos, em particular aqueles 
ocorridos no pós-Guerra Fria, tendencialmente não reconhece centralidade ao território 
enquanto causa de conlito. No entanto, um incidente fronteiriço entre a Eritreia e a 
Etiópia em  despoletou uma crise que viria a escalar, resultando num conlito de dois 
anos e meio com cerca de .  vítimas. A tese central do presente artigo sublinha a 
centralidade do território nas suas múltiplas dimensões para o entendimento da guerra 
que opôs os dois Estados soberanos. 
Palavras-chave: guerra, território, fronteiras, identidades, nacionalismo 
Recebido  de Junho de  Aceite para publicação  de Novembro de 
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On 6 May 1998 occurred a border incident between the Eritrean small infantry 
unit and Ethiopian local militia and administrators. This border incident led to 
the loss of life on the Eritrean side (Connell, 1998). Eritrea’s decision on 12 May 
1998 to move its regular armoured forces to the disputed border village Badme, 
and its environs, escalated the crisis leading to the military engagement between 
Eritrean and Ethiopian regular armed forces. The move by the Eritrean Defence 
Force (EDF) triggered Ethiopia’s formal announcement in Parliament, on 13 May 
1998, of its determination to act in defence of its sovereignty if Eritrean forces 
failed to withdraw from the disputed areas.
This article focuses speciically on how the war unfolded and how it was 
brought to an end with a particular focus on the territorial dimensions of the 
war. The article covers the period from May 12, 1998 until the December 12, 2000 
Algiers peace agreement.
The irst part of the article provides the historical and political background 
of Eritrea and Ethiopia vis-à-vis the Horn of Africa region. The second section 
provides a brief overview of Eritrea’s war for independence and of the rela-
tions between the two insurgent movements which opposed the Derg regime1 in 
Ethiopia: the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF). The article argues that beyond the continuities with the 
thirty-year civil war in Ethiopia, namely in the relations between the two former 
insurgent movements, the 1998-2000 war was waged between the armed forces 
of two sovereign states: Eritrea and Ethiopia.
In addition to territory, the political and military dimensions, as well as the 
socio-economic dimensions are critical to understanding how the war unfolded. 
However within the scope of this article, territory will remain the central focus. 
The section on territory seeks to understand how the divergent interpretations 
of history on both sides of the border were fuelled by the warfare propaganda. 
This section will demonstrate that the two-year war became an important source 
of national mythology for both states. Indeed, this state of afairs bore similarities 
with previous wars which had opposed Ethiopia to an external enemy (Clapham, 
2001, p. 9).
The inal section seeks to understand how the positions in the batlefront 
relected the ambiguity and the diferent conceptions and practices of various 
groups with regard to the border between the two states. 
1 The Derg refers to the Marxist military regime established in the atermath of the  Revolution.
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Eritrea’s war for independence and the relations 
between the two insurgent movements
Ethiopia and Eritrea were both part of the Abyssinian Empire, thus sharing 
a common history, among other traits2, until Italy colonized Eritrea (1890-1941). 
However, as Jacquin-Berdal rightly claims (quoting Halliday and Molyneux) 
“neither ‘Eritrea’ nor Ethiopia as presently constituted existed in the pre-colonial 
period” (Halliday & Molyneux as quoted in Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, p. 85). When 
Ethiopia defeated the invading Italian “rmy at the historical batle of “dwa  
and Italy was forced to shelve its plan to expand further south of the Mereb river 
(the river between Eritrea and Ethiopia) the two countries followed divergent 
trajectories.
Between 1935 and 1941, when Italy invaded and occupied Ethiopia, although 
Addis Ababa was the capital of the Italian East African Empire, Eritrea remained 
the main commercial and economic centre.
With Italy’s defeat during World War II, Britain administered the ex-Italian 
colony until Eritrea’s future was determined.
The period of British Administration (1941-1952) triggered the politicisation 
of Eritreans around a nationalist project. 
Ultimately, the destiny of Eritrea was ixed by the United Nations Resolution 
390 A (V) of 1952 which established its status as an autonomous region within the 
Federation with Ethiopia. However, the progressive deterioration of the federal 
arrangements and Ethiopia’s inal abrogation of the Federation sparked dissent 
and contributed to the emergency of the armed struggle.
The mobilization of support across various groups became the main chal-
lenge and aim of the insurgent movements during the war for independence. 
Ethiopia’s forceful reaction to the insurgency and the targeting of civilians both 
in the lowlands and in the highlands during the war for independence played 
a decisive role in the acceptance and legitimacy of the insurgency among large 
sections of the society.
Failure to recognize the correctness of Eritrea’s claim to self-determination at 
the time of African independences resulted in the three-decade war for independ-
ence which led to 65,000 military (Pool, 1998, p. 19) and between 150,000-250,000 
civilian deaths (Jacquin-Berdal & Mengistu, 2006, p. 97) on Eritrea’s side.
2 “lthough Eritrea’s coastal regions were subjected to several external inluences throughout the centuries, 
Eritrea’s highlands were closely bound to Ethiopia’s Tigray. Indeed, the Eritrean Tigrinya are ethnically linked 
to the Ethiopian Tigrayans. The leaders of the EPLF and the TPLF, who hold currently the positions of Heads of 
States, President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, are both Tigrayans. The 
Eritrean Tigrinya and the Ethiopian Tigrayans speak the same language – Tigrinya –, follow the same religious 
allegiance – Orthodox Christianity – among other features (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, pp. 82-83). 
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The secession of Eritrea and the transition period ran smoothly and were ad-
vantageous to the ruling parties.
The nature of the post-insurgent states was conditioned by the diferent legiti-
macy enjoyed by the movements which had led the insurgency against the Derg. 
According to Clapham, the EPLF constituted a classical example of a secession 
insurgency, while the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (which 
descended from the regional Tigray People’s Liberation Front) was a reform in-
surgency. “lthough ideologically and military these were diferent movements 
“in none did the government concede power to the opposition” (Clapman, 1996, 
p. 242).
The nature of the relations between the insurgent movements during the 
civil war afected the nature of the relations between the ruling parties in its af-
termath. The psychological legacy, according to some observers (Interviews in 
Addis Ababa, July 2003), was relevant because the relationship was unequal, 
with the TPLF in the weakest and most dependent position. This situation was 
diametrically reversed with the TPLF’s capture of the Ethiopian state.
According to Péninou one can identify the moment of rupture between the 
leaderships of the EPLF and the TPLF as . “t this time, a strategic conlict arose 
around the issue of Tigray’s independence. The rupture lasted until 1988. For 
the EPLF, it was clear that Eritrea’s independence could only be recognized as 
long as there was a change of regime in Ethiopia. Simultaneously, the EPLF was 
rightly convinced that neither the UN nor the OAU would recognize its claim to 
self-determination to the extent that it implied a disintegration of Ethiopia. For 
this reason, Eritrea’s independence could not be linked to Tigray’s secession from 
Ethiopia (Péninou, 2000).
The seeds for disagreement between the leaderships were planted in this pe-
riod. The purposes of the struggle forced them to cooperate in order to achieve 
the common aim: the overthrow of the Derg. Once the civil war was over and 
Eritrea achieved sovereignty and the TPLF emerged at the helm of the state the 
unresolved issues re-surfaced.
The creation of a new state and new borders
Territorial disputes in the Horn of Africa have persisted throughout the post-
colonial period. The nature of the process of creation of colonial borders sowed 
the seeds for future disputes. Four major players were involved in this process: 
Ethiopia and three external powers – Britain, France and Italy.
Despite the consensual acceptance of uti possidetis principle in Africa, as laid 
down in the OAU border resolution of 1964, ambiguities in the colonial treaties 
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with regard to the delimitation of borders led to territorial disputes. At the height 
of independence territorial disputes happened among the new contiguous neigh-
bouring countries: Kenya, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia. Ethiopia was the only 
state in the Horn of “frica that had been at the centre of the crating of colonial 
boundaries. One of the striking contrasts between the Horn of Africa and West 
and Southern Africa is with regard to the type of war in which they have en-
gaged. Inter-state territorial disputes in West Africa and Southern Africa have not 
escalated into inter-state wars (Korns, 2002, p. 369). This is particularly remark-
able because it is widely acknowledged that territory was one of the major causes 
of inter-state wars (Kocs, 1995; Vasquez, 1995). In contrast, the Horn of Africa 
has been the theatre of two inter-state wars over borders, namely the 1977-1978 
war between Somalia and Ethiopia and the 1998-2000 war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia (Buzan & Weaver, 2003; Lemke, 2002).
Although Eritrea’s independence did not challenge uti possidetis, its newly ac-
quired sovereignty led to changes in the length of shared borders between con-
tiguous neighbouring countries.
With Eritrea’s secession from Ethiopia the potential for border disputes be-
tween the new state and neighbouring states was overlooked, in particular with 
its southern neighbour. Indeed, any changes in Ethiopia’s territory were signii-
cant to the contiguous neighbouring countries. As a consequence, its role in the 
Horn of Africa remained pivotal for regional peace and security.
“ter independence Eritrea was immediately involved in border and mari-
time disputes with its neighbours, namely Sudan (1994), Yemen (1995), Djibouti 
 Connell,  and, inally, the border dispute with Ethiopia , which 
escalated into full-scale war.
One must seek to understand why Eritrea’s other militarized disputes over 
territory did not escalate into full-scale war. One key diference between these 
disputes and the one with Ethiopia was the degree of rivalry between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia before the outbreak of hostilities. In the three other disputes in which 
Eritrea was engaged rivalry was less salient when compared to the increasing 
rivalry with Ethiopia, which was related to economic and political issues, namely 
terms of trade, access to the ports, and currency regimes.
It is worth noting, however, that the relations between the ruling parties 
had been much closer during the pre-independence period. Indeed, the alliance 
between the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF) was crucial for Eritrea’s international recognition as a sov-
ereign state3. In addition, although an interstate war, the 1998-2000 war displayed 
3 This contention, however, does not diminish the legitimacy of Eritrea’s claim for self-determination.
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some characteristics of a civil war, including the fact that civil wars tend to be less 
prone to de-escalation and more intense. 
The comparison of Eritrea’s foreign policy towards its neighbouring states 
conirms the theoretical claim that the interaction between contested territory, 
contiguity, and rivalry results in an impressive recipe for conlict escalation 
(Rasler & Thompson, 2006, p. 159). 
This combination may in part explain why the dispute with Ethiopia esca-
lated into full-scale war, in clear contrast with the other disputes in which Eritrea 
was engaged over its borders.
Eritrea’s foreign policy can only be understood in the context of the preva-
lence of a militarist ethos in the realm of domestic politics. Eritrea’s leadership, 
at the helm of the post-insurgent state, persisted on state building activities that 
contributed to the militarization of state and society. In this sense, Eritrea’s for-
eign policy mirrored domestic politics and both were embedded in the same con-
tinuum of state building. It can plausibly be argued that what happened with 
neighbouring states was not intended to divert atention from internal opposi-
tion; Eritrea’s foreign policy resembled an extension of the state’s relation with 
its own domestic opposition. Indeed, all opposition to the ruling party’s concep-
tion of Eritrean statehood, either domestic or international, justiied the incum-
bent regime’s forceful intervention. Consequentially, any citizen that opposed the 
state became an enemy, and any state or movement in neighbouring states that 
opposed the regime, and its leadership, became an enemy of the state. In a con-
text where foreign policy making is personality driven, any opposition to the re-
gime is perceived as a threat to the state itself (Connell, 2005; Paulos Tesfagiorgis, 
2004). The domestic constituencies (both within the territory of the state and in 
the diaspora) that opposed the regime became enemies of the state. This domestic 
and foreign policy orientation led to the isolation of the regime by neighbouring 
states during and in the atermath of the war with Ethiopia. Eritrea was forced 
to forge alliances increasingly outside the region. In February 2005 Saudi Arabia 
signed a 20 million US dollar loan agreement with Eritrea (BBC, 2005). Indeed, de-
spite Saudi Arabia’s previous support to Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) factions, 
which opposed the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice / Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (PFDJ/EPLF) regime (Clapham, 1995, p. 126), the isolation of the 
regime in part explains this signiicant shit of alliance.
The creation of a new state in a volatile and conlict prone region posed spe-
ciic challenges to contiguous neighbouring states. With regard to Eritrea’s crea-
tion and its subsequent foreign policy towards the region, the key lesson to retain 
is the need to pay particular atention to border delimitation and demarcation at 
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the time of state creation and recognition. This feature acquires particular signii-
cance to mitigate and eliminate potential tensions arising out of border disputes. 
“s the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea conirms, once established, borders are 
only changed at great cost (Jacquin-Berdal, 2002, p. 219).
As Tekeste Negash and Tronvoll state: 
In four weeks what had started as a minor border skirmish had escalated into a 
full-scale bilateral war – the irst such war on the continent in decades , p. .
Indeed, the intensity of violence, in terms of casualties, far exceeded the 1,000-
death threshold in any given year. Indeed, references to the total number of casu-
alties range from 50,000 (Tekeste Negash & Tronvoll, 2000, p. 99; Steves, 2003; 
World Bank, 2002) to 100,000 (Amanuel Mehreteab, 2002; Steves, 2003; World 
Bank, 2002). The available evidence sets the combat related deaths at a minimum 
of 87,000 (Amanuel Mehreteab, 2002, p. 2).
Understanding the multiple dimensions of territory
As the war unfolded, the symbolic and historical dimensions of territory 
gained saliency. This section seeks to understand how the construction of national 
identity became entrenched along the batle lines and led to the enhancement of 
divergent interpretations of history and of founding national myths to mobilize 
“soldiers” and “public opinion” on both sides of the border. Finally, the section 
examines the relationship between the borders and national/ local identities. 
Historical and symbolic dimensions
The conduct of the war on the military front was accompanied by an increas-
ing saliency of historical grievances that had long remained silenced. On the 
Ethiopian side, three historical themes re-emerged during the conlict:  the 
comparison between the victory against the Italians in  in the ”atle of “dwa 
and the victory against the Eritreans in February 1999 in Operation Sunset; 2) 
the deinition of the Eritrean enemy dating back to the involvement of Eritrean 
troops, the ascaris, in the Italian occupation of Ethiopia in World War II, and 3) 
the rehabilitation of the EPRDF/ TPLF as the bearers of a long tradition of Ethiopian 
unity whenever the sovereignty of the state is threatened by external aggres-
sion.
”adme, the spot of the conlict, was soon to achieve the same standing as 
Adwa. Adwa, as will be further discussed, was the key location of Ethiopian re-
sistance during the 19th century’s scramble for Africa by the major European 
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powers. “s the war unfolded, the importance atached to the areas under dispute 
increased. According to Triulzi, the deliberate coincidence of the celebrations of 
the victory at “dwa and the Ethiopian successful re-capture of ”adme relects 
this intentional deinition of the interstate war as the second “dwa  Triulzi, 
2002, p. 99).
The war propaganda relected a much broader resentment against Eritrea’s 
independence. During the Federation years (1952-1962) and especially with the 
annexation of Eritrea as an Ethiopian Province, any mention of Eritrean collabo-
ration with Italian troops was simply silenced. In clear contrast to the Imperial 
regime and Derg, during the two-year border war it was common to ind refer-
ences in the media to the participation of Eritreans, ascaris, in Italy’s successful 
campaign that led to the ive-year occupation of Ethiopia -  ibid., p. 
97).
The demands of the war intensiied centralizing pressures over issues such as 
conscription. Meles Zenawi’s legitimacy decreased within the TPLF, but improved 
within the coalition, the EPRDF, and among other groups in society. Indeed, the 
ruling party used the war to prove its “nationalist credentials” (Interview in 
“ddis “baba, July . Despite all internal divisions the moto Ethiopia irst  
seemed to re-emerge from the ashes of the previous regime. Indeed, this marks 
continuity in Ethiopian politics through successive regimes, since Emperor 
Menelik had managed to guarantee the borders of the sovereign Ethiopian state 
during the European powers’ “scramble for Africa”.
During the inal stage of the war Prime Minister Meles Zenawi played the 
victory card successfully. The inal ofensive against Eritrean armed forces was 
launched during the May 2000 elections. The coincidence of these two major 
events seems to suggest that this strategy was followed to boost the EPRDF sup-
port’s base throughout the country.
On the Eritrean side, one historical theme re-emerged during the conlict: the 
genealogy of the Project of a Greater Tigray was traced back to the incursions of 
Emperor Yohannes and his commander Ras Alula in the 1870s and 1880s (Reid, 
2003, p. 379).
Reid suggests that this historical parallel emerged in the late 1990s. Indeed, 
during their struggle for self-determination Eritreans rarely substantiated their 
claims in a deeply-rooted historical identity.
As Jacquin-Berdal pointed out: 
Eritreans deined their nationalist aspiration as emanating from their shared colo-
nial experience and presented the question of independence essentially in territo-
rial and international legal terms, arguing that Eritrea’s right to self-determination 
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should be decided on the same grounds as those of other ex-African colonies (2002, 
p. 86).
These developments highlight the relevance of the historical dimensions of 
territory to understanding the centrality of the border question in this particular 
war. In addition, these considerations point to a more signiicant development. 
As the war unfolded, the propaganda warfare led not only to diverging interpre-
tations of history but also to a revival of historical myths. The media and the war-
ring parties daily fuelled these historical myths and, more signiicantly, the states 
constructed and sanctioned their revival. The subsequent section will analyse the 
revival of these myths to illuminate their role as boundary-deining mechanisms, 
which gained particular salience as the war unfolded.
Historical myths as boundary-deining mechanisms
Ethiopia and Eritrea and especially the Amhara and the Tigrinya-speaking 
communities north and south of the Mereb (Abyssinia) shared a common history 
up to the 19th century, i.e., until the Italian colonization of Eritrea (Donham, 1986, 
p. 19). Their foundation myths were based upon the dynastic, as opposed to the 
national, principle. With the emergence of nationalism in Eritrea a signiicant 
shit occurred. “s Sorenson claims:
 (…) while contact with Abyssinian kings to the south was acknowledged, Eritrean 
nationalists claimed that no Abyssinian king ruled the whole territory and that 
Turkish and Egyptian occupation contributed to the development of a separate 
regional history (Sorenson, 1993, p. 43). 
Eritrea’s nationalism had to be pushed against the past “when Eritrea was 
inextricably linked to the main Abyssinian body” (Reid, 2001, p. 268). Indeed, 
Eritrea’s nationalism is “historically grounded in the liberation war” and posed 
an intrinsic challenge to the myth of “Greater Ethiopia” (Dorman, 2005, p. 217; 
Jacquin-Berdal, 2000; 2002) . This section does not examine the historical accuracy 
of the facts; its aim is to analyse how the interpretation of history and its use by 
the ruling parties during both the civil war and the two-year war, elevated his-
torical myths as boundary deining mechanisms.
The 1998-2000 war was accompanied by diametrically opposed interpreta-
tions of the Italian expansion in the Horn of Africa. While for Eritrea the colo-
nial legacy remained the legitimate basis for self-determination and was used to 
nurture state and national identity formation and consolidation ater , for 
Ethiopia the legacy of the state’s successful military victory over Italy’s atempt to 
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colonize Ethiopia in the 19th century remained one of the founding myths of the 
modern sovereign state. 
The incumbent regime in Ethiopia equated the Ethio-Eritrean war with the 
19th century armed conlict between Ethiopia and Italy. The incumbent regime in 
Eritrea equated the Ethio-Eritrean war with the armed conlict between the EPLF 
and Ethiopia.
During the war, propaganda, either in the media and/or over the Internet, dif-
fused the Eritrean and Ethiopian versions of these historical myths and counter-
myths. The intensity of the war propaganda simultaneously fuelled and mirrored 
the bloodshed on the frontlines4.
This next section examines how propaganda during the war played on al-
leged historical grievances.
The myth of being sui generis
In the Eritrean case, the myth of being sui generis antedated the 1998-2000 
war. The myth of being sui generis characterized the relations between the two 
Fronts during the civil war. One of the central sources of tension between the 
EPLF and the TPLF was the later’s initial ambiguity with regard to the insurgency’s 
aims (Young, 1996, pp. 105-120). When the TPLF voiced its aim of seeking self-
determination for Tigray, the EPLF immediately resisted this trend and exerted 
pressure upon the TPLF leadership to abandon it. From the EPLF standpoint, TPLF’s 
atempted secession would not only fail to gather legitimacy internationally, but 
would also undermine the Eritrean case by stealing its singularity and speciicity 
Marchal, , p. . In addition, this aim would imperil Eritrea’s ight for self-
determination, as it raised the suspicion of a plea to revive the idea of a “Greater 
Tigray”, uniting in one territory the two Tigrinya-speaking communities north 
and south of the Mereb. This concern was anchored on the merger of Eritrea 
and Tigray, as a Greater Tigray Province, during the Italian re-organization of 
Ethiopia within the East African Empire, which occurred between 1936 and 1941 
(Gilkes, 1975, p. 192).
At the beginning of the hostilities, from the Eritrean standpoint, the escalation 
of the ”adme crisis relected the woyane  i.e. TPLF) project to revive the “Greater 
Tigray” aim. From the Ethiopian standpoint, Medhane Tadesse responded that 
4 Hansen (2006). Stig Harle Jansen’s thesis contributes to the understanding of the evolution of the public de-
bate and decision-making before and during the war. The thesis relects upon the opening up of the press and 
shows how the oppositional press’ coverage of the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea ater  and with 
the outbreak of the hostilities constrained the EPRDF to follow a more nationalistic direction. Federica Guazzini 
(2004) contributes to the understanding of the public debates on the Internet. Guazzini claims that the debates 
relected the diferent usages of history and of the liberation war in order to make sense of the armed conlict. 
Simultaneously it re-opened the debate on Eritrea’s relations with Tigray (and Ethiopia at a later stage) and on the 
relations between shabya (EPLF) and woyane (TPLF).
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“the TPLF killed the whole project once and for all when it declared in 1975 that 
the Eritrean question was a colonial question” (Medhane, 1999, p. 86).
The counter-myth to the sui generis is the myth at common descent (Kolstø, 
2005, p. 19). Indeed, the rhetoric in Addis Ababa and among non-Tigrinya speak-
ing communities5 in Ethiopia is quite distinct from that of the Ethiopian Tigrinya-
speaking communities with regard to Eritrea. In spite of the war, Tigrinya-
speaking communities and Tigrayans, based either in the capital or in Tigray, 
insisted that: “We and the Eritreans are the same ‘people’ and now we are sepa-
rated because of the closure of the border” (Several interviews in Tigray, July 
2005).
Others, while sharing the perception of the commonalities between the “peo-
ple”, would insist that the problem was between the leaderships (Interview in 
Addis Ababa, August 2005).
In the end, it was not the partition of the territory and Eritrea’s independence 
that separated the Tigrinya-speaking communities in Ethiopia from their coun-
terpart across the border; it was the two-year war and the closure of the border 
that followed it. 
In comparison with other colonial states in Africa, Eritrea’s trajectory was sui 
generis because the areas from which it had been divided had remained formally 
independent (Halliday & Molineux, 1981, p. 175). As Halliday and Molyneux ar-
gue, the fact that Ethiopia had not undergone a corresponding period of colonial 
rule did not obliterate the preceding territorial claim (ibid., p. 175). The Tigrayan 
rulers in the 19th century had resented Menelik’s concession to the Italians of part 
of their territory (Rubenson, 1976). Eritrea’s claim that the 1998-2000 war was a 
second war for its independence should be understood against this background.
The myth of being antimurale and martyrium
In the context of the two-year war one historian promptly captured the reap-
pearance of the past in the antagonistic propaganda warfare. Triulzi was among 
the irst to aptly draw atention to this function of historical myths. ”y equat-
ing the recapture of Badme in February 1999 to a “second Adwa” the Ethiopian 
government was drawing upon the foundation myth of the Ethiopian modern 
sovereign state (Triulzi, 2002). Badme sealed the victory of Ethiopia over exter-
nal aggression (Rubenson, 1976), acquiring a similar standing to Adwa a century 
earlier. Furthermore, both Adwa and Badme shared the same geographical lo-
cation within Ethiopia: in Tigray’s region. As a century earlier, the region was 
5 I used the term Tigrinya-speaking communities rather than Tigrayan ethnic group because in Tigray people 
who identify with other ethnic groups also speak Tigrinya and tend to share this view.
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once again portrayed as the main theatre where Ethiopia stood united against the 
threat to its territorial integrity.
This strategy successfully contributed to: i) legitimise the government’s con-
duct, ii) extend the basis of support of the EPRDF, and iii) continue with calls to 
contributions from the larger society to the war efort, either with troops and/
or taxes. Indeed, the war forced the ruling party to downplay the saliency of 
the sub-nationalities, entailed by the federal model based on ethnicity, and shit 
to revive skilfully “the old centralist interpretation of the survival of Ethiopian 
independence” (Barnes, 2003, p. 511).
In conclusion, during Eritrea’s insurgency, Ethiopia’s emphasis on the need 
to defend Eritrea as part of the true “civilization” was revived in two ways: i) 
the long standing medieval myth of the Orthodox Christian Kingdom in Africa: 
Ethiopia as the bulwark of Christianity against Islamic expansion, and ii) the myth 
of Ethiopia as the bulwark of independent statehood in Africa against European 
colonialism. In the two instances Ethiopia’s unity in the face of “external aggres-
sion” was implicitly celebrated.
Finally, in the myth of being antimurale, Tigray, within Ethiopia’s historical 
trajectory, was once again the region where the defence of territorial integrity 
against external aggression was upheld. The EPRDF/TPLF revived the historical 
myth used by the Derg to counter Ethiopia’s northern insurgencies, especially 
the EPLF.
Ethiopia’s historical myth of Adwa purports to its grandeur, power and might 
as the sole state in Africa to have victoriously resisted European colonialism and 
defeated a European power. Eritrea’s historical myth, in stark contrast, reports 
to the heroic resistance of its ighters, the martyrs, and their sacriice to prevent 
Eritrea from remaining the target of discrimination and persecution from its 
neighbour.
According to an ex-combatant for the EPLF, Eritrea’s conduct during the two-
year war was entirely justiied. The ex-combatant emphasised Eritrea’s stance as 
relective of its continuous need for self-defence in face of its powerful neighbour 
to the south: “Eritrea just wants peace but our neighbour keeps on tempting us” 
(Interview in Asmara, August 2004).
Finally, the analysis of the inter-state war against the background of the civil 
war sheds light not only on the understanding of which historical myths were 
brought back to the fore, but also helps to understand the ones which faded away 
or were purposefully silenced in the oicial discourse. 
While the EPLF and the TPLF alliance in the civil war against the Derg was 
build on the common experience of oppression and discrimination of Eritrea and 
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Tigray at the hands of successive Ethiopian regimes6, the collective memory of 
this common experience was totally silenced in Ethiopia during the two-year war. 
Tigray’s martyrs of the civil war were replaced by the region’s singular standing 
as the outpost of the Ethiopian state against external aggression.
The myth of antiquitas
Ethiopia could draw more openly on the myth of antiquitas. Eritrea, on the 
other hand, relied on the counter-myth. In this respect, the Eritrean leadership 
was forced to silence the past in order to be consistent with the historical ground-
ing of Eritrean nationalism on the war for independence. Any claim of antiquitas 
prior to Italian colonization would run counter to the entire ediice upon which 
the Eritrean nation-state had been legitimately constructed7, but the border 
under dispute was that deined according to the colonial treaties. The borders 
had crystallized by 1936, i.e. prior to the incorporation of Ethiopia into the East 
African Empire. The quagmire was that neither the colonial state in Eritrea, nor 
the modern sovereign state in Ethiopia had ixed borders throughout their exist-
ence. Paraphrasing Kolstø: “the borders waxed and waned” over the decades of 
their political coexistence (Kolstø, 2005, p. 22).
As Triulzi summarized it, the borders changed status frequently since the 
19th century up to Eritrea’s independence. The border status shited from mere 
internal-administrative marker, to a colonial border, to dissolution, to inter-state 
border during the one-decade Federation, becoming an internal border again, 
going through a phase of contested no-man’s-land during the civil war and, i-
nally, acquiring the status of a national border (Triulzi, 2006, p. 7).
Two points related to the waning of the border ater its crystallization in  
are particularly relevant. Firstly, the implications of defeat and the period of 
Italian occupation are not readily acknowledged in Ethiopia, with the exception 
of references to the external aggression and accompanying patriotism (Barnes, 
, p. . Indeed, as ”arnes notes: The Italian experience, while leeting, 
was crucial for Ethiopia’s post-war sovereignty” (ibid., p. 513). Secondly, the TPLF 
alliance with the EPLF in the later’s confrontation with the ELF had implications 
with regard to the administration of the “liberated areas”. During the two-year 
war not only was the alliance between the two silenced or re-interpreted in light 
of the previous period of tension in the 1980s, but also the implications of this 
alliance on the TPLF and ELF confrontation, which contributed to the expulsion of 
ELF combatants from Eritrea (Jacquin-Berdal & Plaut, 2005).
6 Especially during the Derg’s Red Terror campaign.
7 “ccording to John Sorenson, Eritrean nationalist discourse rarely projects a uniied identity into antiquity. 
Instead, it emphasises a decisive transformation under Italian colonialism” (Sorenson, 1993, p. 42).
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Conceptions and practices with regard to the boundaries
Since Eritrea’s formal independence and up to the outbreak of hostilities, the 
local conceptions of the boundaries between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the prac-
tices of borderland groups across borders had not substantially changed. The 
groups in the borderlands continued to conduct their everyday business as usu-
al, but under improved conditions due to the end of the civil war. The groups 
continued to intermarry and visit relatives on both sides of the border, and to 
many the border was hardly noticed. Evidence collected especially in the Central 
Sector indicated that daily practices were based on decisions taken regardless of 
the border (Abbink, 2001; Tronvoll, 2003).
In the Central Front when hostilities broke out, many ran and sought for hid-
ing places regardless of the border, others were directed by the EDF to Eritrea. 
”ehailu “bebe’s research indings suggested that leeing the area and panic was 
the irst stage of reaction to the war  , p. . Some went to the nearest town 
in Ethiopia (Adigrat) and others sought refuge in nearby caves and localities re-
moved from the frontline. Behailu Abebe’s research showed the variety of coping 
mechanisms developed during wartime conditions and the diferent experiences 
of those who were caught up in the middle of hostilities (ibid., p. 411).
The situation in this border area was diferent from the situation in other bor-
der areas, especially in the western and eastern sectors, where the majority of 
the residents did not identify with Tigrinya-speaking groups in the two states. 
In contrast, the norm in this part of Tigray, in villages around Zalambessa, was 
luidity of identity and social boundary markers were invisible or irrelevant” 
(ibid., p. 422). Humera8 (Western Front) did not fall within the border-disputed 
areas, as the line in this part of the border is clearly drawn along the Tekezze 
River. However, the town was shelled several times during the course of the war 
(Hammond, 2004). The citizens of this area did not escape the massive military 
recruitment campaign and were enlisted. As Hammond’s research shows, the 
new-comers to the area, mainly Ethiopians who had been living as refugees in 
Sudan until the overthrow of the Derg regime, in order to be fully re-integrated 
faced similar pressure to other peripheral peoples. Although in Ethiopia con-
scription is not compulsory, “voluntary” conscription was one of the central com-
ponents of becoming a good citizen. With the war, the call to take up arms was 
articulated in the context of the much needed support around the national cause. 
These new-comers seldom escaped joining the local militia and/ or from carrying 
out their military “duties”. The family’s access to local critical resources (land 
8 Humera is located in Ethiopia’s north-western border, in Western Tigray, near the border with Sudan and with 
Eritrea. The nearest village on the Eritrean side of the border is Om Hajer.
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and water) and local services (health and education) was dependent upon the 
head of household and male member’s fulilment of their duties  as Ethiopian 
citizens (ibid.).
“t the onset of the war it was expected that those afected directly by the 
war were likely to be displaced not across state frontiers but within their state. 
Empirical evidence collected mainly from the Central Sector, near Zalambessa 
and the Irob area, shows that the movement of borderland groups relected the 
predominant local conceptions and practices with regard to the border. When 
hostilities started, the borderland groups sought refuge regardless of the border. 
”oth Eritrean citizens led to Ethiopia and Ethiopian citizens to Eritrea. Their re-
turn to Ethiopia either during the course of or ater the third round of ighting is 
consistent with other accounts9 showing how the degree of animosity and hatred 
grew exponentially as the third round of ighting unfolded. For the irst time, 
since the outbreak of hostilities, the Ethiopian citizens who had sought refuge 
in Eritrea, and waited for the end of hostilities to cross the border, started to fear 
reprisals from the Eritrean army, to an extent which had been absent during the 
previous rounds of ighting Interview Tygran region, “digrat, July . 
The conduct of the war impacted on the local conceptions of the boundaries 
that used to be predominantly based on their openness. The introduction of the 
Eritrean currency (Nakfa) had already started the process of transformation of the 
border. The trench lines built along the border imposed a physical marker of the 
border, which had an impact on local conceptions and practices. The boundaries 
became entrenched in notions of obstruction, obstacle and interdiction. In one 
of the irst accounts of the conlict, “bbink rightly claimed that the war sealed 
the irreversible secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia” (Abbink, 1998, p. 562). This 
process was efectively sealed with its transformation into the main theatre of the 
conlict and with the closure of the border in the atermath of the cease-ire. 
During the hostilities the existence of many websites and on-line forums for 
discussion allowed the mobilisation and involvement of a key external constitu-
ency of the two states: the diaspora10. Guazzini’s research showed how a “war 
of words” was waged over the Internet. Not coincidently, the escalation of the 
propaganda mirrored the intensity on the batleield. During the third round 
when the Ethiopian armed forces invaded Eritrea, the Eritrean websites intensi-
ied a campaign of hatred against their Tigrinya counterparts south of the Mereb 
9 Federica Guazzini’s research on cyberspace shows that the escalation of the systematic campaign of hatred 
on the Eritrean part toward Ethiopian citizens in Eritrea coincided with the beginning of the Third Round of 
Fighting in May . This shit came as retaliation for Ethiopia’s invasion of Eritrea Guazzini, , p. .
10 The article follows Terrence Lyons’ deinition, i.e., what deines a diaspora is participation in activities 
designed to sustain linkages to the homeland” (Lyons, 2006, p. 113).
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(Guazzini, 2001, p. 566; Guazzini, 2004). This participation had implications for 
the debate around the war’s background conditions and what its aims should be. 
The degree and intensity of participation of the diaspora both in inancing the 
war efort11 and in framing the debate around the war) should not be overlooked. 
Indeed, this is one of the key characteristics highlighted in the “new wars litera-
ture” relevant for the understanding of this “old” war12.
Lyons has developed reconciliation work with the Ethiopian diaspora and, 
at the time of writing, is developing a research project on the impact of conlict-
generated diasporas on homeland conlicts Lyons, . The research indings 
show that members of the Ethiopian diaspora had diferent conceptions of what 
the space labelled Ethiopia should be. The three groups ofered competing vi-
sions of the homeland. 
One group emphasised the overarching unity of Ethiopians and interde-1) 
pendence among the Ethiopian people. To them, Ethiopia represented a 
glorious historical and territorial entity to which unity and loyalty was 
owed. For some, this conception of Ethiopia included the entire territory 
of the currently recognized state as well as the neighbouring state of Eri-
trea.
For another group the territorial space occupied by “Ethiopia” included 2) 
“Oromia”, the territory occupied by the Oromo people who awaited their 
legitimate self-determination. To them, Ethiopia merely represented a 
geographic concept rather than a source of positive identity based on vol-
untary association. Thus, for the Oromo, Oromia rather than Ethiopia was 
their homeland, with clear territorial boundaries.
“ third group shared the territorial deinition of the homeland put forth by 3) 
the irst. However, this group shared the second group’s resentment from 
oppression from successive despotic regimes from Northern Ethiopia 
toward the peoples of southern Ethiopia (Lyons, 2006, pp. 124-125).
These indings call atention to the fact that despite divergences the three con-
ceptions had a common denominator: a vision of the homeland with territorial 
dimensions. 
Pausewang rightly claims that a majority of the urban elite rejected the in-
dependence of Eritrea in 1993. With the 1998-2000 war they have gradually ac-
cepted Eritrea’s independence but in its atermath still hold that the port of “ssab 
11 The Eritrean government induced the diaspora’s contribution to inancing the war.
12 The “new wars literature” seeks to demonstrate the role of diasporas, under the globalization of communications, 
in “the funding, techniques and politics of wars” (Kaldor, 2005, p. 211).
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should have remained within Ethiopia’s sovereign territory (Pausewang, 2004, 
pp. 144-145). However, a note of caution is required with regard to how far this 
conception relects the majority’s vision of what Ethiopia should be ater Eritrea’s 
independence (ibid., pp. 142-146). 
Without the creation of conditions for the borderland groups to adjust their 
practices across borders within the framework of peaceful inter-state relations, 
the divergent conceptions of the various Ethiopian constituencies will remain 
either anachronistic or meaningless. Eritrea’s continuity as a sovereign state re-
mains largely independent from these conceptions, but the destinies of the citi-
zens on both sides of the border remain tragically afected by them. For the bor-
derland groups the war and the closure of the border led to a change of practices 
that, in turn, impacted upon the conceptions with regard to the border and, more 
signiicantly, with regard to the other .
Indeed, the empirical evidence conirms that the war was about the disputed 
boundary in its relation to national identity. 
Conclusion
The article is critical in understanding how the conduct of the war led to a 
transformation of the importance atached to the various dimensions of territory. 
Furthermore, the conduct of the war led to the transformation of the war aims on 
various levels. 
“lthough depicted initially from Eritrea as a conlict between Eritrea and the 
Northern Region of Ethiopia-Tigray, the war was conducted between the armed 
forces of the two sovereign states.
The outbreak of hostilities, and the intensity of the violence on the batle fronts 
during the two-year war, raised the question of nationalities. With the national 
question at the forefront, the re-deinition of citizens of both states ensued. The 
right of Eritreans living in Ethiopia to dual-citizenship ceased and the war justi-
ied their expulsion under unlawful conditions. The Ethiopians from the border 
areas seeking refuge in Eritrea during the war increasingly faced discriminatory 
treatment to the point of fearing for their own safety, and were forced to return to 
Ethiopia during the inal round of ighting. From the outbreak of hostilities until 
the cease-ire was inally signed, signiicant changes occurred at various levels. 
Badme, from a barren strip of land, was transformed into a second Adwa, 
i.e., new symbolic meanings from an enduring site of memory were atached to 
”adme. Furthermore, the victory in the inal ofensive marked the end of a major 
war of national identity (Clapham, 2003). 
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Once the fog of war dissipates, the time is ripe to render the war decision-
makers accountable for their decisions, even in states where civil society is pre-
vented from participating in the key debates that shape its destiny.
The prevalence of repressive state apparatus and authoritarian regimes in the 
two countries prevents any initiatives of reconciliation emanating from the civil-
ian constituencies directly afected by the war: the borderland communities and 
the Ethiopians and Eritreans with links to both countries. Without the opening 
up of space for civil society to participate in the “healing of the recent past” not 
only will the borders remain closed but the development of the two countries 
will be delected from its original aim: to foster peace and stability, both domesti-
cally and in the region, through cooperation in mutually advantageous terms.
References
“bbink, J. . ”rieing: The Eritrean-Ethiopian border dispute. African Afairs, 97, pp. 
551-565.
Abbink, J. (2001). Creating borders: Exploring the impact of the Ethio-Eritrean war on 
the local population. Africa  Rivista dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, LVI (4), 
447-458.
Amanuel Mehreteab. (2002). Veteran combatants do not fade away: A comparative study on 
two demobilization and reintegration exercises in Eritrea. Bonn International Center for 
Conversion. 
Barnes, C. (2003). Sovereignty, identity and modernity: Understanding Ethiopia. African 
Afairs, , pp. 507-514.
BBC Monitoring Service. (2005, February 8). Eritrea Saudi Arabia sign 20m US dollar 
loan agreement. “ccessed December , , in htp://www.eritreadaily.net/news/
article380205002.htm
Behailu Abebe. (2004). War stories, displacement and coping experiences of the displaced 
from the Ethio-Eritrean war. In A. Pankhurst, & F. Piguet (Eds.), People, space and the 
state  Migration, resetlement and displacement in Ethiopia. Addis Ababa University.
”uzan, ”., & Waever, O. . Sub-Saharan “frica: Security dynamics in a seting of weak 
and failed states. In B. Buzan, & O. Waever (Eds.), Regions and powers: The structure of 
international security. Cambridge University Press.
Clapham, C. (1995). Ethiopia and Eritrea: The politics of post-insurgency. In J. A. Wiseman 
(Ed.), Democracy and political change in Sub-Saharan Africa. New York: Routledge. 
Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and the international system: The politics of state survival. Cambridge 
University Press.
Clapham, C. (2001). War and state formation in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Paper presented at 
the Failed States Conference, Florence, 10-14 April.
Clapham, C. (2003). Guerre et construction de l’État dans la Corne de l’Afrique. In P. 
Hassner, & R. Marchal (Eds.), Guerres et sociétés: États et violence après la Guerre Froide. 
Paris: Karthala.
Connell, D. “utomn . Report from the ield: From alliance to the brink of all-out war: 
Explaining the Eritrea-Ethiopia border crisis. Middle East Report, , pp. 40-42.
Connell, D. (2005). A conversation with Petros Solomon, August 23, 2001. In D. Connell 
(Ed.), Conversations with Eritrean political prisoners. Trenton & Asmara: Red Sea Press.
40 THE CONDUCT OF AN INTER-STATE WAR AND MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF TERRITORY: 1998-2000 ERITREA-ETHIOPIA WAR
Donham, D. (1986). Old Abyssinia and the new Ethiopian empire: Themes in social history. 
In D. Donham, & W. James (Eds.), The Southern marches of Imperial Ethiopia: Essays in 
history and social anthropology. Cambridge University Press.
Dorman, S. R. (2005). Narratives of nationalism in Eritrea: Research and revisionism. 
Nations and Nationalism, 11 (2), 203-222.
Gilkes, P. (1975). The dying Lion: Feudalism and modernization in Ethiopia. London: Julian 
Friedmann.
Guazzini, F. . Rilessione sulle identità di guerra nel cyberspazio: Il caso eritreo-
etiopico. Africa  Rivista dell’Istituto Italiano per l’Africa e l’Oriente, LVI (4), 532-572.
Guazzini, F. (2004). The construction of political nationalism on the Web: Borders, social 
spaces and identities in the Ethio-Eritrean case study. International Conference States, 
Borders and Nations: Negotiating Citizenship in Africa, May 19-21. Unpublished paper, 
Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh. 
Halliday, F., & Molyneux, M. (1981). The Ethiopian revolution. London: Verso.
Hammond, L. C. (2004). This place will become home: Refugee repatriation to Ethiopia. Ithaca & 
London: Cornell University Press.
Hansen, S. J. (2006, January 11). Organisational culture at war  Ethiopian decision-making and 
the war with Eritrea - . Doctoral dissertation, Department of International 
Politics, Aberystwyth, University of Wales.
Jacquin-Berdal, D. (2000). State and war in the formation of Eritrean national identity. In 
S. O. Vandersluis (Ed.), The state and identity construction in international relations (pp. 
49-75). London: MacMillan Press.
Jacquin-Berdal, D. (2000, June 5-11). Ethiopia-Eritrea: Addis Ababa’s victory. West Africa, 
pp. 24-25.
Jacquin-Berdal, D. (2002). Nationalism and ethnicity in the Horn of Africa  A critique of the 
ethnic interpretation. Lewiston, Queenston, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press.
Jacquin-Berdal, D., & Mengistu, A. (2006). Nationalism and identity in Ethiopia and Eritrea: 
Building multiethnic states. In D. A. Bekoe (Ed.), East Africa and the Horn  Confronting 
challenges to good governance. Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner.
Jacquin-Berdal, D., & Plaut, M. (2005). Uninished business  Ethiopia and Eritrea at war. 
Trenton & Asmara: Red Sea Press. 
Jacquin-Berdal, D., & Plaut, M. (2005). Notes from participant-observation at the One day 
Conference-Eritrean Initiative/ Reconciliation. London, 21 May.
Kaldor, M. (2005). Elaborating the ”New Wars” thesis. In I. Duyvesteyn, & J. Angstrom 
(Eds.), Rethinking the nature of war. London & New York: Frank Cass.
Kocs, S. A. (1995). Territorial disputes and interstate war, 1945-1987. The Journal of Politics, 
57 (1), 159-175. 
Kolstø, P. (Ed.) (2005). Myths and boundaries in South-Eastern Europe. London: Hurst & Co.
Lemke, D. (2002). Regions of war and peace. Cambridge University Press.
Lyons, T. . Diasporas and homeland conlict. In M. Kahler, & ”. F. Walter Eds. , 
Territoriality and conlict in an era of globalization. Cambridge University Press.
Marchal, R. (1993). L’après-Mengistu dans la Corne de l’Afrique: Une stabilisation 
impossible? Cultures & Conlits, 8, pp. 40-63. Accessed May 25, 2005, in htp://www.
conlits.org/document .html 
41cadernos de estudos africanos  •  julho-dezembro de   •  , - ALEXANDRA MAGNÓLIA DIAS
Medhane Tadesse. (1999). The Eritrean-Ethiopian war  Retrospect and prospects. Relections 
on the making of conlicts in the Horn of Africa - . Addis Ababa: Mega Printing 
Enterprise.
Paulos Tesfagiorgis. (2004). A brief understanding of the current crisis in Eritrea: What can 
be done? In G. M. Sørbø, & S. Pausewang (Eds.), Prospects for peace, security and human 
rights in Africa’s Horn (pp.151-163). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Pausewang, S. (2004). Aborted or nascent democracy? Structural reasons for the failure of 
democratisation in Ethiopia. In G. M. Sørbø, & S. Pausewang (Eds.), Prospects for peace, 
security and human rights in Africa’s Horn (pp. 130-150). Bergen: Fagbokforlaget.
Péninou, J.-L. (2000, juillet). Les ambitions cachées d’Addis-Abeba: Ethiopie-Erythrée, 
une paix en trompe l’oeil. Le Monde Diplomatique. Accessed in htp://www.monde-
diplomatique.fr/2000/07/PENINOU/14025
Pool, D. (1998). The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front. In C. Clapham (Ed.), African 
guerrillas. Fountain & Indiana: James Currey.
Rasler, K. “., & Thompson, W. R. . Contested territory, strategic rivalries, and conlict 
escalation. International Studies Quarterly, 5  (1), 145-167.
Reid, R. (2001). The challenge of the past: The quest for historical legitimacy in independent 
Eritrea. History in Africa, 28, pp. 239-272. 
Reid, R. . Old problems in new conlicts: Some observations on Eritrea and its 
relations with Tigray, from liberation struggle to inter-state war. Africa, 73 (3), 369-
401.
Rubenson, S. (1976). The survival of Ethiopian independence. London: Heinemann.
Sorenson, J. (1993). Imagining Ethiopia  Struggles for history and identity in the Horn of Africa. 
New Brunswick, N.J: Rutgers University Press.
Steves, F. (2003). Regime change and war: Domestic politics and the escalation of the 
Ethiopia-Eritrea conlict. Cambridge Review of International Afairs, 16 (1), 119-133.
Tekeste Negash, & Tronvoll, K. (2000). Brothers at war: Making sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian 
war. Oxford & Athens: James Currey & Ohio University Press.
Triulzi, A. (2002). Violence and the acknowledgement of tense past in the Horn: A note on 
the Ethio-Eritrean war (1998-2000). Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, 2, pp. 91-102.
Triulzi, A. (2006). Badme: Competing claims and symbology along a contested border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. AEGIS Conference African cities: Competing claims on 
urban space (June 15-16). Unpublished paper, Centre of African Studies, University of 
Edinburgh.
Tronvoll, K. (2003, March). Identities in conlict  An ethnography of war and the politics of 
identity in Ethiopia - . Doctoral dissertation, Department of Anthropology, 
London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)/ University of London.
Vasquez, J. “. . Why do neighbors ight? Proximity, interaction, or territoriality. 
Journal of Peace Research, 32 (3), 277-293.
World Bank. (2002, May 16). Emergency demobilization & reintegration: Eritrea 
P . “ccessed June , , in htp://go.worldbank.org/ G ”T KOO
Young, J. (1996). Eritrean People’s Liberation Fronts: A history of tension and pragmatism. 
Journal of Modern African Studies, 34 (1), pp. 105-120.
